ON DECONSTRUCTIONISM
here are few areas in which the currently fashionable assault on objectivity has been more prominent than in connection with the study of language and the texts that we produce by its means. The "deconstructionism" associated with the name of Jacques Derrida is Exhibit No. 1 here.
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Deconstructionism is a theory regarding the interpretation of texts that denies any prospect of realizing objectivity in this domain. Initially projected with regard to literary texts, the enthusiasm of its more ambitious exponents soon led them to expand the theory's application to texts in general-historical, biographical, philosophical, what have you. The doctrinal core of the position involves two theses, first, that a text always allows many alternative interpretative constructions whose elaboration is the proper mission of the interpretative enterprise, and second, that all these various interpretations are effectively coequal in merit-that none can be dismissed as unsuitable, inappropriate, incompetent, or the like. At the core of this doctrinal stance lies a view of textual plasticity-that as the enterprise of text interpretation proceeds, it brings to view an ever-increasing range of viable and more or less equi-meritorious alternative interpretations. As deconstructionism sees the matter, the enterprise of text interpretation accordingly confronts us with an inevitable plethora of coequal alternative possibilities. On this basis, the partisans of deconstructionism condemn with the dismissive epithet of textualism the view that a given text has a meaning in so stable and objective way as to favor one particular interpretation over the rest. They insist that there is no room for objectivity here because interpretation is a matter of the pervasive variability of "to each his own".
Insofar as this deconstructionist perspectives represents a doctrine rather than a methodological attitude about text interpretation, it is a position based on a group of hermeneutical views or contentions that may be T sketched roughly as follows: In the domain of text interpretation we face a situation of -(1) Omnitextuality: Any proposed interpretation of a text must itself take the form of simply another text. In the hermeneutical sphere there is no way of exiting from the textual domain.
(2) Plasticity: Every text has multiple interpretations-it admits a plurality of diverse constructions.
(3) Equivalency: Every interpretation is as good as any other. These various interpretative constructions of a text are all of equal or roughly equal merit: none is definitive, canonical, discriminatively appropriate-indeed none is substantially more cogent or tenable than the others.
This state of affairs means that in interpreting texts we always confront a plurality of (roughly co-meritorious) variants. Text interpretation admits of no rational validation or invalidation of one resolution over against another. It is simply an exercise of free imagination: a project in which we can do no more than to explore interesting possibilities and cannot hope to validate a particular result as optimal in a cogent and stable way. Where issues of interpretation are concerned, we can only explore alternatives and cannot substantiate particular resolutions; we can project possibilities but cannot reduce them by eliminative processes of plausibility assessment. Accordingly, we should never ask what a text does mean, but only what it can or might mean. In the realm of text interpretation there are no forced choices: it is an inherently indecisive enterprise-a fact that, happily, manages to "liberate us from the prison-house of language". 2 Deconstructionism is, in sum, a doctrine of indifferentist relativism with respect to textual interpretation. In its refusal to let those restrictive considerations of rational cogency come into play, it is the diametric opposite of objectivism in this domain.
How can a more judgmental rationalism come to judicious grips with such an anarchical position? Clearly, there is little point in quarreling with theses (1) and (2) of the preceding argumentation, seeing that the former is an obvious and evident truth, and that the latter a fact amply substantiated by historical evidence. And it follows from these two theses that any interpretation itself admits of variant interpretations. The problematic crux of deconstructionism's argument for a relativistic indifferentiation of text interpretation is thus premise (3), with its assertion of merit equivalency. But is this premise tenable? Is the hermeneutic realm indeed a free-for-all ruled by the idea that all interpretations are created equal? Is the textual interpreter indeed wandering through a hall of mirrors, wholly unable to implement the distinction between appearance and reality?
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT: THE FLAW IN THE DECON-STRUCTION'S OINTMENT
The idea that a merit-annihilating indifferentism holds reign in the sphere of textual interpretation is willfully blind to a crucial reality. Interpretations-and the texts through which they are conveyed-are emphatically not created equal: Some make sense, some only nonsense; some are ambiguous (have many plausible interpretations), others are more definite; some convey much information, others little; some state truths, some falsehoods. What the fallacy of indifferentist relativism of text interpretation overlooks, to its own decisive detriment, is the crucial matter of context.
The process of deconstruction-of interpretatively dissolving any and every text into a plurality of supposedly merit-equivalent constructionscan and should be offset by the process of reconstruction, which calls for viewing texts within their larger contexts. After all, texts inevitably have a setting-historical, cultural, authorial-on which their actual meaning is critically dependent. And this contextual setting projects beyond the textual realm itself in comprising both processes (know-how) and products (artifacts) relating to human action in relevant regards. In particular, it encompasses both noncommunicative practices (behavioral) and communicative practices, including the processes, procedures, and methods in relation to text-contemporaneous styles of life, the products of noncommunicative processes and practices (material involvements), and the relevant social traditions. To the extent that we do not understand the ways and means of a people's mode of living-what they are concerned to do and to producewe will have great difficulty in understanding their texts. In sum, texts have a wider functional context, and this means that text interpretation is not a matter of free-floating imagination-it is a matter of scholarship.
The crucial point that has to be urged against deconstructionism's hermeneutical egalitarianism is not that every reality is virtual. The textual realm is not closed because texts often as not concern themselves with the real world. They can and do bear on noncommunicative processes and in-teractions with artifacts of a text-external realm. There are not only tennis rulebooks and tennis manuals but also tennis courts and players and games. Texts interconnect with reality through the mediation of intelligent agents.
Neglect of this crucial contextual dimension leads to what is perhaps the most severe shortcoming of deconstructionism, betokening its deeply problematic commitment to the idea that the textual realm is self-sufficient and autonomous. Such a stance reflects the bias of academics committed to a logocentrism that sees the world in terms of discourse and forgets that it is not the case that everything is a matter of language through and through. Our texts and our use of words are, for the most part, no more than just one other instrumentality by which we function in a nontextual world-in this instance previously the social world of human interaction. To see texts and the libraries that warehouse them as context-disconnectedly self-sufficient is akin to contemplating the molehills without the mole. 
COHERENCE AS AN INTERPRETATIVE STANDARD
To be sure, all of the various interpretations of a text that are not totally bizarre have in view of this circumstance some sort of merit-there is almost always something to be said for them. But to affirm this is not, of course, to say that all those different (nonabsurd) interpretations are thereby equally meritorious. To concede the prospect of a hermeneutical underdetermination that allows for a plurality of alternative nonabsurd interpretations is certainly not to say that any such interpretation is every bit as viable as any other.
Any viable approach to the theory of text interpretation must be normative: it must be predicated on standards and criteria that provide for the evaluation of better and worse, of sensible and foolish, of responsible and irresponsible. Sensible text interpretation is not a matter of anything-goes imaginative flights into the never-never world of free-floating fancy; it is tethered to the down-to-earth realities of the case imposed by rational standards of validity and appropriateness. The situation here is akin to the old story that trades on the Talmudic belief that each passage of the Torah contains forty-nine possible meanings. The story has it that once a student offered an interpretation of a passage to the rabbi who was giving him instruction. "No, you are quite wrong," the rabbi proclaimed. "How can you say that?" protested the student. "Didn't you say there are forty-nine meanings for each passage?" "Yes," replied the rabbi, "but yours isn't one of them." Given the often underdeterminative impetus of our contextual resources, the interpretation of texts is sometimes somewhat flexible. But there are definite limits to the elasticity that is available here.
The idea that any and every construal of a text-any bending or twisting of its message-is as good as any other is particularly dubious with any text that has a how-to aspect, whether this be small scale (recipes for baking bread, instructions for cleaning a rifle) or large scale (prescriptions for successful salesmanship, guidelines to scanning Spanish poetry). In such matters there is no anything-goes plasticity; some ways of interpreting that text and implementing the lessons of such an interpretation are materially better than others. The merit of deconstructionism lies in its stress on the importance of texts in humanistic studies and on the pluralism of interesting, discussible, and attention-worthy interpretations. But its defect lies in the idea that interpretations are created equal-that issues of quality and cogency are out of place in this domain.
The crucial task of text interpretation is thus one of not merely examining possibilities but of evaluating them. One must go beyond the survey of possible interpretations to assess which of them are plausible and-going even further-to endeavor to decide which (if any) among them is optimal. But how to implement this project?
It would be a profound error to see the textual sector as closed-to take the line that it is all a matter of texts "all the way through". Texts come into contact with contexts. The cardinal instrumentality of text interpretation is represented by the principle of hermeneutical optimization according to a standard of merit provided by the coherence of the proposed interpretation of a text with its overall context. Whatever interpretation best harmonizes with a text's overall context is ipso facto a superior interpretation that thereby has greater claims on our acceptance. In the light of such contextual considerations, text interpretations are emphatically not created equal.
Philosophy, of course, cares devotedly for the truth of things. But in order to assess whether what a text says is true (or even merely plausible) we have to determine just what it is that the text asserts. To be sure, the two issues are not entirely independent. Let it be that a given text T has three possible alternative interpretations T 1 , T 2 , and T 3 . In weighing them against each other we must take into account: 2. their claims to communicative significance and informativeness (in the context at issue)
their claims to contextual coherence
And here the plausibility (or truth) of the substantive claims at issue is not enough. For informativeness too is of the essence. Neither do we want truth that is not instructive in the context, nor yet truths that are trivial and insignificant. The best interpretation is one that affords optimal balance among such desiderata.
The most sensible approach to the existence of a variety of alternative text interpretations is thus what might be called the coherence theory of interpretation. 4 After all, text interpretation is a practice that can be more or less adequate in the light of the ultimate good of systematization: of fitting texts into context in a way that realizes a systemic learning. Not only can a text have a subtext of implicit but inarticulate messages but it also-and more usually-has a supertext, a wider contextual environment within which its own message must be construed. It is in fact coherence with the resources of context (in the widest sense of this term) that is at once the appropriate instrument of text interpretation and the impetus to objectivity in this domain.
For sensible text interpretation one must reject the mistaken idea that it is permissible to forget the existence of an extratextual world with which we humans interrelate on the basis of texts. The use of words is not something free-wheeling that stands disconnected from the verbal and behavioral environment in which they figure. The textual realm is not disconnected from the realm of human praxis. (Indeed, even moving into and through that textual realm is a matter of praxis-producing and consuming texts is a matter of doing things.) The context of a text is set not only by other related texts but also by the artifacts that constitute its material environment and by the common elements of experience that we are ourselves inclined to share with that text's author in virtue of the fact of sharing a common experiential framework in a shared human setting in a common world. And this endows texts with an objective aspect.
To be sure, with textual interpretation as with all other branches of rational endeavor we can obtain no categorical guarantees. Here, as in any other inductive situation, all that rationality can do for us is to offer us the best available prospect of successful goal realization. But insofar as we are reasonable this circumstance should also satisfy us, seeing that it is absurd to ask for more than can possibly be had.
AGAINST TEXTUAL EGALITARIANISM IN COMMUNICATIVE CONTEXTS
Jacques Derrida maintains in his Speech and Phenomena 5 that Western scholarship has privileged voice (authorial thought and intention) over writing (the resultant objective text)-process over product. But this involves a profound misconception. It overlooks the import of the hermeneutic circle: the lesson that in the endeavor to understand texts issues of process and product are coordinate, that neither can be subordinated to the other-let alone consigned to oblivion. To agree with Derrida in subordinating process (voice) to product (the textual product in writing) would be to ignore the crucial lesson that what a text is depends on its function, on what it sets out to do. And that at this point the author's own position is dominant. The texts being of the author's making, we need to take the context of its production into account to determine what it actually is as a product.
The reason why interpretations are not created equal lies in circumstance of their contextual embedding in voice-related matters. Texts are produced with a view to their communicative mission; they are instruments of communication-of conveying information and canalizing to actioneven where the only action at issue is one of deliberation or discussion. Even merely belles-lettristic texts can guide people toward implementation of beliefs and values in ways that can be pointless and meretricious-or the reverse (to say nothing about matters of teaching and writing). Texts can be veridical or mendacious, helpful or hurtful. They are not disconnected from life: they can be life enhancing or life degrading, can impel us to take views that conduce to self-enhancement or to self-loathing.
Medical texts influence the medications we take. Engineering texts influence the projects we construct. Literary texts influence the values we maintain and the lives we lead on their basis. Philosophical texts influence our priorities and the way we conduct our intellectual affairs. Texts have a bearing not only on what we think but also on what we do: our actions and activities, our experiments and observations, our predictions and ventures at control. And insofar as texts are elements of a wider teleological domain, their adequate interpretation will pivot on this fact. The textual world is not self-contained; it is inextricably interconnected with the realm of ac-tion, activity, and living. And actions (even intellectual action such as understanding) can be more or less successful. Accordingly, we can evaluate texts (representations) because they have a pragmatic dimension in the communicative domain.
To be sure one cannot leave writing out of it. The public dimension is uneliminable. In using language to produce his text, the author avails himself of a public instrumentality. What words mean is a matter of convention-of the social and, as it were, decisional modus operandi of human linguistic and symbolic arrangements. And of course what can appropriately (warrantedly, correctly) be said once those controversial arrangements are in place is something that is itself no longer free-floating and decisional. Once we decide what cat and mat mean, the question of whether one can appropriately assert "The cat is on the mat" is not an issue open for decisional resolution: our contribution has come to an end and the rest lies with the nature of things. What our words stand for-what we mean by cat or mat or dog-is entirely a matter of human arrangements, of the decision of linguistic communities. But once these matters are fixed, the question of whether and where and how frequently dogs and cats are to be encountered in nature-and in the proximity of one another and of mats-is something that only nature can resolve; the conventional arrangements of languageusing communities have nothing further to do with it. The world's concrete realities now gain the upper hand. Here text interpretation once more requires an objective and, as it were, contextual dimension.
The critical flaw of a deconstructionist relativism of texts and their interpretations lies in the fact that rational evaluation is possible also in this interpretative sphere. Texts can and should be evaluated in terms of their contextual ramifications. The appropriateness of thought and assertion in matters of communication will generally depend on objective factors outside the domain of individual wish or action. It simply is not the case that everything in the textual realm is created equal-as deconstructionist relativism would have us believe. The resources of systemic coherence within an overall purposive context preclude an indifferentist egalitarianism of textual interpretation and provide for an interpretative objectivism.
In philosophy at least a sensible venture in text interpretation must reject the mistaken idea that the use of words is something free-wheeling that spins along disconnected from the larger verbal and behavioral environment in which they figure. It is a profound error to see the textual sector is closed-to take the line that it is all a matter of texts "all the way through", seeing that texts come equipped with contexts.
IRENIC CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
There is, of course, always the prospect of a halfway house between personal subjectivity and impersonal objectivity that goes with the interpersonal agreement that can obtain within particular communities.
6 But this halfway house does not afford a really habitable space in the present context. Communities and their practices and traditions are almost as fickle and fallible as individuals. They, too, can overlook and neglect crucial considerations. Even when we know how the community does comport itself we can still ask how it should comport itself. And this is something we can do-though admittedly only within limits-with respect to the community to which we ourselves belong. Objectivity is an ideal toward which we can and should strive, but no one says that the process is easy. The prospect of different questions looms before us. What does the text mean? is one sort of issue, and What might the text mean? another. Here as elsewhere the answer pivots on what the question at issue is.
The situation is not, however, entirely one-sided. There is something, after all, that can be said for the deconstructionist perspective. But interestingly enough, this something falls wholly outside the sphere of meaningoriented hermeneutics. When we speak of interpreting a literary text, two distinctly different things can be at issue. It is crucial to distinguish between:
• exegetical interpretation-the endeavor to elucidate the meaning of a text in relation to the intentions of its producer vis-à-vis the intended audience then and there
• imaginative (re-)interpretation-the recasting or re-presentation of a text in an endeavor to evoke aesthetic responses and affective resonances in a current (present-day) recipient
In doing actual (exegetical) interpretation we operate in the domain of scholarship. Here issues of context become central, because the pivotal question is: What did the author mean by the text? The point of concern is with the original meaning and purport of the text. The issue of historical authenticity is paramount. But a text-and not only a text but any artifact which, like a painting or sculpture has an informative aspect-can be regarded abstractly, in a context-independent way. Here the issue is not one of producer centrality but one of consumer centrality, and the issue is not "What does the text mean for its author?" but rather "What can the text mean for us?" Insofar as interpretation is at issue this is not the hermeneutical interpretation of meaning explanation at all, but rather the sort of thing at issue when we speak of a performer's interpretation of a musical composition or the director's interpretation of a play. What we do here is not so much to interpret the text as to creatively reinterpret it or endeavor to endow it with current relevancy and interest. Producing a play or a musical composition affords a paradigm example of the circumstance. For the most part we are here not trying for historical authenticity but for the enlistment of interest. We are not addressing issues of scholarship but issues of edification or entertainment. And so, authorship (and with it context) becomes of subsidiary importance-and imaginative creativity comes to the forefront. Where this sort of enterprise is at issue, the free-wheeling inventiveness envisioned by deconstructionisms has something to be said for it. But the hermeneutical commerce with texts geared to the enterprise of understanding their actual meaning as concrete historical artifacts is of course something quite different.
Viewed in this light, the principal thesis of our deliberations attains greater clarity. It is that while philosophical texts often are interpretatively underdeterminative and admit a variety of theoretically possible interpretations, this range is generally narrowed-and often drastically reduced-by plausibility considerations of the sort at issue with considerations of contextual fit, which is to say by the processes and procedures of good oldfashioned scholarship.
The crux, then, is the contrast between text interpretation as conscientious scholarly exegesis as against an imaginative de-(or perhaps better re-) construction of texts freed from the constraint of considerations of historical context-and thus with issues of scholarly exegesis in suspension. And behind this duality of approach there looms a far-reaching quarrel in the area of educational approach and policy. The question is who owns the textsby whose ground rules of textual interpretation is the game to be played. Are we to deal in scholarly exegesis or in imaginative edification? Are the text consumers at issue expected to bring scholarly investigation to bear, or are they being invited to indulge in imaginative flights of fancy? And, in particular, in conjuring with texts in the educational process, are we to advantage the philologically and historically well informed, or are we to create a more level playing field of imaginative sensibility where anyone can play?
In sum, then, the fact has to be recognized that texts come into being in relation to rather different sorts of aims and purposes. In particular, they can be made either for the transmission of information and ideas or for thought provocation and the stimulation of the inventive imagination. And therefore two quite different interpretative enterprises can be at issue. Only where we put substantive (let alone scholarly) concerns aside and use textinterpretation as a means to thought provocation-as a training ground for the free-ranging imagination-does a free-floating deconstructionist approach to texts make any sense. The prospect of a theoretical reconciliation is thus at hand: It's all a matter of how you understand interpretation. Different things can be at stake. Scholarly exegesis is one, deconstructively imaginative innovation is another.
In the communicative use of texts, where the transmission of information is the most important factor, the impetus to objectivity is paramount. And this holds even for literary texts-given that the authors of such works generally desire and endeavor to be understood in their own terms. Ultimately, it is a matter of ownership. Hermeneuticists recognize the ownership rights of authors and the scholars who address their products. Deconstructionists think that texts belong to interpreters to do with as they wish in using texts as springboards for ventures in the imaginative expansion of sensitivity.
To be sure, life is not there for toil alone. (All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy!) There will be time for serious thought and time for imaginative fancy. But it is only when intellectual endeavor takes a playful turn that deconstructivism comes into play. When it is the informative aspect in any of its dimensions that is at issue in the texts with which we deal, then our interpretative efforts will have to take the more scholarly road where objectivity once again comes to the fore.
All the same, it must be granted that there are some grains of truth in the deconstructionist position. In matters of text interpretation, perfectionand thus the knock-down, drag-out augmentation that goes with it-will often indeed be unachievable. We thus do well to concede that perfection and decisive completeness may well not be attainable in this domain. Still the fact remains that while we may not be able to complete our interpretative tasks in a final and definite way we can-and should-labor to improve on what we have. Progress without the prospect of perfection is the watchword in hermeneutics as in morals.
Granted, all of the various interpretations of a text that are not totally bizarre have (by assumption) some sort of merit-there is almost always something to be said for them. In view of the generally underdeterminative impetus of our contextual resources, the interpretation of texts is usually somewhat flexible. But there are definite limits to the elasticity that is available here. The partisans of a hermeneutical relativism that maintains the equivalency of possible interpretations are talking through their deconstructionist hats. 
